

***Conference on Asia Visions and Voices: Geopolitical Consequences of US-China Tensions
(October 11-12, 2024, in Taipei)***

Key Points and Takeaways

Host Institutions:

Rajawali Foundation Institute for Asia, Harvard Kennedy School
Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University
Taipei School of Economics and Political Science Foundation

Report prepared by Yves Tiberghien (yves.tiberghien@ubc.ca), UBC and TSE

Overview

Under the leadership of Professor Tony Saich, Chairman Huang Huang-Hsiung, and Dean Huang Chao-Shi, The Rajawali Foundation Institute for Asia, Harvard Kennedy School, the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science (TSE), and the National Tsing Hua University Taipei School of Economics and Political Science Foundation (TSEF) have been cooperating for several years to analyze the changing Asia-Pacific economic and geopolitical order.

As part of this ongoing dialogue and given rapid changes in US politics and in China-US relations, the three institutions felt the urgent need for a high-profile conference to evaluate how other players in Asia adjust to current disruptions. In particular, they decided that it was crucial and timely to hear Asian perceptions and voices on a set of critical issue areas.

In this context, the October 2024 conference focused on great power competition and middle-state agencies in the Indo-Pacific.

National Tsinghua University President John Kao notes that this timely conference follows directly the previous dialogue on semiconductor geopolitics. It is urgent to expand the scope of the analysis and to adopt multi-dimensional dialogues, he argues.

Major changes at the systemic level shape constraints and incentives for all players in the region. As noted by Anthony Saich, China's rise has led to a changing regional order, but also a changing boundary between security and economic dimensions. The accelerating US-China confrontation forms the dominant feature. It is accompanied by rising geopolitical tensions and a security-first mentality, as well as economic slow-balization (or partial decoupling), and the switch to a multi-modal world. How resilient is the existing security and economic order in East Asia to the growing US-China confrontation (Yves Tiberghien)? It is ultimately unknown.

The conference focuses largely on the reactions of other nations in the region and the options of such middle powers (or global majority countries, as coined by Danny Quah). Presenters analyze the multiple adjustment strategies by third nations and their respective resilience. Acharya notes the urgency of finding a third way or “third party order,” an approach that entails open regionalism and value overlap, as opposed to value clash.

Empirically, scholars analyze the matrix of diverse processes unfolding across country cases and in two main empirical fields: green technology and digital technology.

Ultimately, the discussions at the conference raise an important question: are Global South middle players providing lasting resilience and anti-fragile characteristics to globalization and global supply chains in times of crisis? Or is their impact more limited? Positions vary in the conference between optimists who see a sustainable multiplex world (Acharya) and those who see reduced space as the US-China competition hardens.

The rest of this short paper presents eight thematic takeaways from the conference and an additional seven lessons from individual country case studies.

Thematic Takeaways

1. We are now in the age of repeated geopolitical shocks and securitization

All presenters note the disruptive nature of current shocks in the global order. Danny Quah argues that the era of economic logic as the glue holding the global order together is eroding. “Economics no longer even tries to stand up to national security.”

Shin-Wha Lee analyzes five external shocks affecting Korea (and other countries): US-China tensions; the war in Ukraine; the North Korean threat; the new North Korea-Russia alliance; and the neutral role taken by ASEAN in current global conflicts.

Other presentations also emphasize the role of accelerating technological transition.

This is a period of repeated disruptions and rapid change, one when all countries seek to adjust their positions and have to deal with major uncertainty.

2. Specifically, the worsening US-China dynamic creates major dilemmas and risks for all countries in the region

There are a range of positions on how to define the accelerating US-China tensions. However, all scholars see this as a structuring factor in the region.

For Anthony Saich, US-China tensions create double dilemmas for nations within East Asia. They must navigate between an economic Asia dominated by China and a security Asia structured by US-led alliances.

Anthony Saich argues that China is an actual first mover in the process of securitization of its economy (with the banning of Google and Facebook in 2018 on security concerns). On the geo-economic front, China has now adopted an approach to reduce its exposure through double circulation and increased reliance on the BRI. China is pushing various countries to fit into the BRI network. Additionally, China's geopolitical risk mitigation strategy involves tighter links with countries that reject US domination and support the BRICS as an instrument of a multipolar order. It also seeks to influence global institutions and agencies where the US has withdrawn by advancing its own values.

For Yu-Shan Wu, we have already entered Cold War 2.0. The post-Cold War era turned out to be an inter-Cold War period.

As for Philip Hsu, he argues that the increasingly aggressive behavior exhibited by both great powers in the region generates a feeling of intensifying crisis and instability. For example, South East Asia must contend with both a growing economic dependence on China and the presence of Chinese artificial islands in the disputed South China Sea zone. He asks whether the accelerating economic competition marks the end of the socialization process in the East Asian zone. And is the practice of hedging by Southeast Asian states sustainable and compatible with ASEAN centrality?

Danny Quah takes a more dispassionate view of China's role, asking whether China's actions amounted to threats to the integrity of the system as a whole.

Selina Ho argues that the rise of China and intensification of the US-China rivalry has three major effects: First, US-China tensions have transformed the regional security order from unipolarity to bipolarity with overlapping competition spheres. Second, US counter-moves against China and its efforts to slow the rise of China have exposed the vulnerability of ASEAN countries, as they are deeply interconnected with both the US and Chinese economies. And third, "the US-China competition is challenging the region's institutions and normative structure centered on ASEAN and ASEAN way."

3. The US-China rivalry has a strong effect on the East Asia economic order, including global trade fragmentation and the reorganization of global supply chains.

Heiwai Tang argues that the recent period of globalization and rapid global integration was exceptional. It required market enhancing technological innovations, reinforcing incentives for the global super power to support multilateralism, and a limited in within-country inequality. These factors don't hold any longer and we have entered a period of global economic

transformation. Heiwai Tang notes that friend-shoring (China+1) is happening and is making supply chains less resilient. We are moving toward a more regionalized, more service-oriented, and more digitized global economy.

Likewise, Alfred Schipke notes the global increase in trade restrictiveness, the reorientation of trade, the impact of geopolitics on FDI flows, and state mobilization of resources (including AI and autonomous driving in the case of China). He also notes the rise of economic bridges, such as Vietnam and Mexico.

4. The rise of the economic security state across the Asia-Pacific is a game-changer

A big theme highlighted through the conference is the rise of economic security strategies from multiple countries and the rise of the economic security state.

Tun-Jen Cheng emphasizes this trend and notes that it was probably invented in Japan (as early as 2010, in the face of Chinese economic coercion measures) and is now being replicated across Asia. Tun-Jen Cheng also notes that, while the prior developmental states had access to big resources due to the rising tides of the economic miracle, the current economic security state is mostly a spending state that has to snatch resources from other sectors. This is a real constraint. Finally, Tun-Jen Cheng argues that China also seeks to manage its economic security, but that the private sector is being hurt in the process, both due to China's focus on securitization and through reduced opportunities abroad. The Chinese counter-move toward BRI and the Global South has serious limitations.

Anthony Saich similarly notes the big shift in conversation and new dynamic unfolding over recent years as we switch from a liberal order and globalization to a process of de-risking and friendshoring. China focuses on double circulation and Made in China 2025 with a growing process of securitization. Outside China, there is an ongoing process of reorganization of supply chains that is largely driven by economic security dynamics.

Ronald Mendoza describes the current period as one of turbulence, uncertainty, and rising geopolitical risk. He argues that G7 countries and partners such as the Philippines seek to de-risk from China and to manage three types of risks:

- ☐ a/ the risk of economic linkages used for geopolitical leverage (economic coercion);
- ☐ b/ the risk of economic disruption during conflicts or shocks like Ukraine or the Middle East;
- ☐ and c/ the risk of geopolitical rivalries.

However, this approach raises several problems. First, government intervention will likely be necessary as firms will not voluntarily de-risk if they absorb the full cost of geopolitical risks. No single firm is willing to internalize the full social cost of those crises. Second, the most cost-effective way of de-risking is to require collective actions across firms and across the international community. This is not easy. Third, values and institutional complementarities matter.

Alfred Schipke adds that the turn to economic security has implications in terms of shifting alliances and trade policies, strategic alliances and partnerships, and efforts to diversify and reshore global supply chains. That said, he also notes that the US has succeeded in diversifying its trade from China, but the share of value-added coming from China has not actually changed. This is because significant trade flows are now routed through intermediary states such as Vietnam and Mexico. Meanwhile, economic security concerns are reorienting FDI flows due to increased scrutiny and security hurdles, and domestic policy adjustments. We see shifts in investment destinations (toward Europe, South East Asia, and Africa), strategic realignment, and particular realignments in strategic sectors.

In sum, Tun-Jen Cheng argues that we are seeing a possible shift from decoupling to derisking, as nations seek to avoid seeing ties weaponized or disrupted. This is a more targeted policy than general decoupling attempts. What remains to be seen is the level to which geopolitics can trump geoeconomics. There will also be regional differences: South East Asia is more likely to resist US pressures and hedge against both superpowers, while North East Asia is more vulnerable to US pressures, given more pressing security threats in that region.

5. Middle States still have a range of options and diverse approaches, particularly ASEAN countries

Anthony Saich outlines the four key questions facing middle states in the facing of structural forces analyzed above.

- ❑ How are nations striving to obtain strategic autonomy? There is a continuum on which countries range (economic, tech, security)
- ❑ What characteristics of states are key for states to avoid being forced into a binary choice?
- ❑ Strengths and weaknesses that help nations meet goals?
- ❑ How can countries benefit from those tensions, exploiting the gaps?

Danny Quah made a powerful point that middle states comprise 80% of humanity. It is not just about small states and middle powers. Danny Quah argues that middle states can exercise agency beyond poisoned shrimp strategies and other sub-ideal options. They can be more than price takers and can affect the outcome. Danny Quah argues for going beyond Thucydidian realist fatalism. In particular, for Danny Quah, middle states have three avenues for agency in the great power competition:

- Inadvertent cooperation, or seeking to align incentives. Cooperation does not have to be contractual;
- Nudging the equilibrium out of great power gridlock;
- And Pathfinder multilateralism

In sum, multilateralism works wonderfully when it works. However, when unavailable, Danny Quah argues that we have tools of plurilateralism (WTO and WTO work around), minilateralism,

and regionalism (Selina Ho). These tools are open and inclusive by design, but robust to non-unanimity. Economics is the glue that holds together the global order since fragmentation is too costly. In other words, third nations can and should stand up for world order.

Heiwai Tang agrees about regional solutions. We may be moving from a fragmented realist order to regionalism.

Suthipand Chirathivat sees resilience in ASEAN's practices of open regionalism and extra-regional trade and investment flows. For ASEAN, triangular interdependence with the US and China has worked well in tandem with the globalization era of the post-Cold War and China's entry into the WTO. Suthipand Chirathivat warns that forcing ASEAN to choose sides will be impossible and disruptive.

Selina Ho is more cautious about the possible options and responses ahead for ASEAN in the context of intensifying US-China rivalry. ASEAN has struggled with its response to the weave of Indo-Pacific strategies and may face uncertain long-term prognosis. ASEAN does have a good track record of nudging great powers into cooperation, but ASEAN faces internal fractures, resulting from pressures within and from without.

6. Not all Middle States are Equal. Success in hedging requires specific assets and a willingness to leverage those assets.

Nguyen Xuan Thanh argues that “you have to have strategic assets and strategic relevance to play in that game (...) You have to be willing to test the superpowers on the value of your strategic assets.”

Alfred Schipke also notes that Vietnam has been more successful than Germany in this approach. A successful Middle State must have assets that it can sell. “For those without the strategic relevance, it is hard to play the same game.” And this is a harder game for ASEAN to play as a grouping. Alfred Schipke adds that the race toward global standards (especially in AI and EV) narrows the space for neutral positions. One standard must be picked. This is why China is so aggressive through BRI to ensure that its standards are imposed globally. This will be a tough challenge for the middle ground that countries such as Vietnam are pursuing.

7. A particular battlefield is green technology and green industrial policy. All Asian countries are deploying active instruments.

Daigee Shaw frames the larger context as an urgent collective necessity to slow climate change and save human civilization. There is an urgency to bring down Green House Gas emissions, and Daigee Shaw's proposed East Asian Climate Club (with a uniform carbon price, carbon border adjustment mechanisms, or CBMA, and a green fund club) could be a solution in Asia. Climate urgency may bring countries together into regional clubs and counteract some of the geopolitical dynamics.

Tain-Jy Chen notes that supply chain cooperation across the board (from silicon to solar modules and system installation) is important. However, he expresses more skepticism about the feasibility of CBAM measures. Tain-Jy Chen also argues that energy is an essential national security item, hence the current wave of solar tariffs, rare earth controls, and other measures. This energy security logic limits the incentive for larger cooperation.

Tze-Luen Lin notes that 80% of emissions are produced by 20 of the (largest) emitters and that it could be easier to focus Daigee Shaw's climate club suggestion on these 20 emitters. Additionally, he argues about the centrality of the China factor, given China's dominance in green tech production and its large overcapacity situation in the sector.

Turning to the feasibility of green industrial policy, VGR Chandran indicated that there is a strong interest in it but that operationalizing it remains hard. True green industrial policy "requires a structural change to move to a new green industry that can address environmental externalities and promote green tech; it needs to build a whole economic system." This is a complex task.

8. In AI and digital technology, industrial policy, sanctions, and state measures are accelerating. They are fragmenting the global ecosystem, but there remains space for the Middle States.

The current unfolding chip and tech war between the US and China forms the broader context for this discussion.

Alfred Schipke notes that China responded to the US chip embargo through a strategic shift in AI development. Unable to acquire N'Vidia chips, China is accelerating homemade AI chips, but is still lagging behind. In response, China is emphasizing specialist AI applications, such as autonomous driving, LIDAR sensor systems.

Harukata Takenaka outlines two types of measures deployed by the US and emulated by Japan and its allies: promotion measures (such as the Chips and Science Act, National Defense Authorization Act, and IRA) and restriction measures (government procurement, private firm contracts, export controls, etc.). These include the October 2022 comprehensive DOC export control measures on chips and computing capacity. Japan has developed an ambitious set of semiconductor policies to secure and recover the production of high-end semiconductor chips. These include the increase in capacity of existing firms, the support for foreign foundries in Japan (TSMC), and the support for the development of a new ambitious tech company, RAPIDUS. Large subsidies are disbursed for these initiatives (Rapidus alone may require \$5 Trillion Yen of support). This is a huge return to METI-driven industrial policy in Japan.

Country Case Takeaways

As noted by Anthony Saich, **Japan** ends up at one end of the continuum of responses. In response to Chinese coercion as early as 2010, China has developed a series of economic security measures and a comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy while bandwagoning clearly with the US as a “loyal” ally. Harukata Takenaka presents a comprehensive outline of measures taken since 2017 in particular, including export license measures and trade restrictions. Policies accelerated under Kishida after 2021. The highlight has been the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act with a focus on securing access to critical minerals and protecting critical infrastructure, IP, and tech R&D. These measures have been enabled by the expanding leadership power of the Prime Minister in Japanese governance. They also represent a reassertion of the role of the state in the Japanese political economy.

The **Korea** case presents adjustments through diverse proactive strategies. Korea shows similarities with Japan but under a more intense security environment with three neighboring threats at once (North Korea, China, and Russia). Shin-Wha Lee summarizes the approach taken by Korea as one of hybrid multilateralism. Korea seeks to partner with like-minded nations (fellow democracies and allies) but also works to persuade non-like-minded countries. Measures pursued by Korea include a very active bundle of policies focused on alliances but also other engagement mechanisms. Shin-Wha Lee outlines eight parallel strategies:

- ❑ 1. Tighter US-ROK relations;
- ❑ 2. Trilateral relations US, Japan, and Korea
- ❑ 3. Balancing security and economic interests through diversifying supply chains and reducing over-reliance on China;
- ❑ 4. Latticework of security arrangements- seeking a more proactive role for SK in multilateral and minilateral institutions such as AUKUS and QUAD;
- ❑ 5. Resumption of China-Japan-Korea dialogue in 2024 after 4.5 years of hiatus in order to balance security links with the US and economic links with China. SK seeks to navigate the tensions;
- ❑ 6. Cooperation with the G7 and Australia;
- ❑ 7. Hybrid multilateralism - combining strong alliances with like-minded nations and role with swing states and unlike-minded nations;
- ❑ And 8. GPS- global pivotal state strategy.

Turning to the Philippines, Ronald Mendoza argues that the country is “trying to develop a more diverse network of partnerships - with many goals,” including critical infrastructure, organized crime reduction, critical minerals (nickel), etc. The national strategic response includes new FTAs and security cooperation agreements with partners such as Korea, India, and Japan. Ronald Mendoza also notes that the Philippines faces some challenges, including the large Chinese role in green technology and semiconductor packaging. The Philippines must find ways to de-risk and navigate the situation with pragmatism.

Vietnam is an unabashed advocate of active multi-alignment. Nguyen Xuan Thanh analyzes Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy strategy in the following terms. The goal is to stay neutral. This approach attracts a high degree of consensus in the leadership due to painful lessons from

devastating wars among great powers on its soil. Vietnam cannot choose the US, as it would risk strong Chinese retaliation and would jeopardize party-to-party relations between the CPV and the CPC. Vietnam may seek more strategic autonomy. However, ultimately, Nguyen Xuan Thanh argues that “Vietnam will pursue a new industrialist policy that will make it more dependent on both China and the US economically,” with a focus on three areas: digital economy and semiconductors, green energy, and transport infrastructure. The leadership is ready to pursue a high-risk, high-reward policy. Vietnam seeks to keep both superpowers engaged and will not enter into any security alliance. Vietnam seems to have a comparative advantage in its ability “to take the risk of being more dependent on both the US and China.” Vietnam does face the risk of potential tariffs from the Trump administration, but the US would then sacrifice its strategic partnership. Vietnam is very careful in its messaging: not moving away from China, but seeking China + 1. In terms of industrial policy, Vietnam seeks to replicate smart state interventions by Japan, Korea, and Taiwan but to avoid risks from corruption and interest group domination.

For VGR Chandran, **Malaysia** is seeking to advance its national interest and position in key technology manufacturing through smart state interventions and regional linkages. Semiconductor and electronics, as well as solar panels, are key focal industries. Malaysian policymakers are seeking to operationalize FDI incentives and shape supply chain localization decisions. They understand that global value chains respond structurally to the institutional environment and particular policy incentives. VGR Chandran recognizes that Malaysia’s positioning will be affected by trade tensions if diversification is not possible.

Australia offers a fascinating case of accelerating green technology transition with state incentives in the midst of a large fossil fuel exporting state. Llewelyn Hughes shows that renewables already represent 40% of electricity used in the National Electricity Market (which represents 80% of electricity in Australia). The policy target intends to reach 82% by 2030 and 70% of new vehicles as new energy vehicles at the same time. Australia is also a critical minerals superpower (including copper, aluminum, nickel, zinc, Vanadium, and lithium). The Australian government has been more active through market-confirming strategies (rather than picking winners) and support for R&D to defray the costs of extraction.

Finally, Colley Hwang offers a powerful description of the pathway Taiwan has taken to develop its semiconductor and tech industries since the 1970s, thanks to visionary industrial policies and hard work by engineers and private companies. Taiwan has positioned itself as the irreplaceable hub of the semiconductor industry, and there is no feasible way to replace Taiwan in the foreseeable future. Colley Hwang notes that 800,000 engineers and employees now work in the Taiwan science industry, and 80% of baseboards and servers in the world are made in Taiwan. 92% of advanced chips are also made in Taiwan, thanks to its hyper-productive cluster.

Meanwhile, Hans Tung shows that the policy context in Taiwan has become more difficult. Political polarization is deeply rooted in Taiwanese politics, and the larger crisis situation provides a facilitating context for further polarization. The worsening US-China relations and the

higher stakes for Taiwan tend to drive a wedge between different groups at a time when cooperation between all sectors of society is needed.

CONFERENCE PROGRAM AND PARTICIPANTS

October 11-12, 2024

Taipei

Host Institutions:

Rajawali Foundation Institute for Asia, Harvard Kennedy School

Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University

Taipei School of Economics and Political Science Foundation

October 11

Opening Remarks (09:30 am)

- John Kao (President, National Tsing Hua University)
- Anthony Saich (Director of the Rajawali Foundation Institute for Asia and Daewoo Professor of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School)

Panel I (09:50 am-11:50 pm)

US-China Tensions (Alphabetically ordered)

Chair: Yu-Shan Wu (Academician, Academia Sinica; Distinguished Research Fellow, and Founding Director, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica; Professor of Political Science, National Taiwan University; Professor, Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University)

Speakers:

- Shin-Wha Lee (Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University)

“The Strategic Direction of Korea as Influenced by US-China Tensions.”

- Danny Quah (Li Ka Shing Professor in Economics; Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore)

“US-China Tensions: Third Nation Strategies to Navigate Shifting Geopolitical and Economic Drivers.”

- Heiwai Tang (Victor and William Fung Professor in Economics; Director, Asia Global Institute; Director, APEC Study Center; Associate Director, Hong Kong Institute of Economics and Business Strategy, University of Hong Kong)

“New Globalization Trends with Geopolitical and Technological Shocks.”

- Hans H. Tung (University Excelsior Chair Professor of Political Science; Associate Dean for Research & Development, College of Social Sciences, National Taiwan University; Professor, Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University)

“Taiwan’s Strategic Ambiguity and Clarity amid US-China Tensions.”

Discussants:

- Yu-Shan Wu (Academician, Academia Sinica; Distinguished Research Fellow, and Founding Director, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica; Professor of Political Science, National Taiwan University; Professor, Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University)
- Yves Tiberghien (Professor, Department of Political Science, UBC; Director Emeritus, Institute of Asian Research; Director UBC Centre for Japanese Research; Visiting Professor, Taipei School of Economics and Political Science)

Lunch (11:50-12:20)

Luncheon Speech 12:30-1:20

Speaker: Colley Hwang (DIGITIMES Chairman)

“Reshaping Global ICT Industry: Under US-China Trade War.”

Panel II (1:30-3:30pm)

Economic Security and Supply Chains (Alphabetically ordered)

Chair: Anthony Saich (Director of the Rajawali Foundation Institute for Asia and Daewoo Professor of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School)

Speakers:

- Ronald Mendoza (Professor of Economics, Ateneo School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University)

"Geopolitical Risks and Economic Derisking: Challenges and Opportunities for the Philippines."

- Alfred Schipke (Professor in Practice; Director, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore)

"The Impact of Geopolitical Fragmentation: China's Trade, Investment, and Technology."

- Harukata Takenaka (Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS))

"Japanese Economic Security Policy."

- Han-Koo Yeo (Peterson Institute for International Economics; Harvard Kennedy School)

"Economic Security and Its Impact on Trade and Supply Chains: Korea's Case."

Discussants:

- Tun-Jen Cheng (Yun-han Chu Chair Professor, Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University; Class of 1935 Professor of Government, Emeritus, The College of William & Mary)
- Hans H. Tung (University Excelsior Chair Professor of Political Science; Associate Dean for Research & Development, College of Social Sciences, National Taiwan University; Professor, Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University)

Tea Break(3:30-3:45pm)

Panel III (3:45-5:45pm)

Technology and Energy Transition (Alphabetically ordered)

Chair: Eugene Chien (Ambassador-at-large, Taiwan R.O.C; Chairman and president, Taiwan Institute for Sustainable Energy)

Speakers:

- VGR Chandran (Professor, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Malaya)

“The Changing Structure of the Global Value Chain of the Solar Industry in Malaysia and Its Implications.”

- Llewelyn Hughes (Professor, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University)

“Australia: Building Green Industry Policy.”

- Daigee Shaw (Research Fellow, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica)

“East Asia Climate Club: Opportunity for Mitigating Risks of Climate Change and Geopolitical Tensions.”

Discussants:

- Tain-Jy Chen (Tain-Jy Chen (Ho Chin Tui Chair Professor; Academic Advisor, Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University)
- Tze-Luen Lin (Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science, National Taiwan University)

October 12

Panel IV (9:00-11:00am)

New Geopolitical Landscape and Strategies (Alphabetically ordered)

Chair: Tun-Jen Cheng (Yun-han Chu Chair Professor, Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University; Class of 1935 Professor of Government, Emeritus, The College of William & Mar)

Speakers:

- Suthipand Chirathivat (Professor Emeritus of Economics, Chulalongkorn University)

“ASEAN Economies in Times of China- US Tensions.”

- Selina Ho (Assistant Professor in International Affairs; Co-Director of the Centre on Asia and Globalisation, National University of Singapore)

“US-China Rivalry and the Implications for the Asian Security Order.”

- Nguyen Xuan Thanh (Lecturer in Public Policy, Fulbright School of Public Policy and Management, Fulbright University of Vietnam)

“Vietnam: Navigating the Geopolitical Tension with a New Industrial Policy.”

Discussants:

- Amitav Acharya (Distinguished Professor of International Relations, School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC, USA; UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance)
- S. Philip Hsu (Professor, Dept. Political Science, National Taiwan University)
- Anthony Saich (Director of the Rajawali Foundation Institute for Asia and Daewoo Professor of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School)

Roundtable Discussion (11:15 am-12:15 pm)

Chaired by Anthony Saich (Daewoo Professor of International Affairs; Director, the Rajawali Foundation Institute for Asia, Harvard Kennedy School) and Tain-Jy Chen (Ho Chin Tui Chair Professor; Academic Advisor, Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University)